This article sets out to examine and critically evaluate Bourdieu's critique of phenomenology as presented in his Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977) and The Logic of Practice (1990). Since it is not possible to properly understand Bourdieu's critique without situating it within the context of his broader theoretical orientation, the article begins with an exploration of some of the key concepts underpinning his version of practice theory. Of particular importance for this article are his notions of habitus, body hexis and doxa. Having reviewed these central constructs, the article turns to discuss Bourdieu's critique of phenomenology. Following this, some of the problems with his critique are examined in light of the work of Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz. The article concludes with two points: a brief discussion of how Bourdieu's project, while at times richly nuanced, can itself be criticized for being an overly deterministic rendering of human thought, feeling and behavior; and a call for anthropologists to rethink the potential benefits offered by phenomenology for anthropological research.
INTRODUCTION
Pierre Bourdieu is perhaps the most influential social theorist of the second half of the 20th century. For over 30 years he has unveiled a steady stream of publications developing his particular take on practice theory that has informed the work of sociologists and anthropologists, as well as scholars from a wide range of other humanistic disciplines. In anthropology Bourdieu's thought seems to have become especially influential, with his theoretical stance utilized, often uncritically, in a number of ethnographic and theoretical works. As influential and ostensibly groundbreaking as Bourdieu is generally perceived to be, however, there are some fundamental flaws in the development of his grand theory, which we believe have, at least in part, stemmed from key misreadings and mischaracterizations of a number of the sources he draws upon in order to define his own theoretical position. In our estimation, this has resulted not only in a misrepresentation of other thinkers' theoretical projects in the service of defining the parameters for Bourdieu's particular variant of practice theory, but has further resulted in what has become a pervasive misreading of Bourdieu's own project by other theorists.
We feel that of particular perniciousness for anthropology, a discipline that has long been interested in exploring how culture serves to shape worlds of experience, is Bourdieu's critical account of the phenomenological tradition. His sphere of influence in the discipline of anthropology, including his critique of phenomenology, has indeed served to obfuscate the many significant insights that phenomenology holds for anthropological explorations of the varieties and structures of experience cross-culturally. For this reason, we hold that Bourdieu's theoretical stance, especially as it applies to his critical appraisal of the phenomenological tradition, is problematic for anthropological research and the development of an adequate theoretical account of cultural experience, which most certainly has to be firmly grounded in a phenomenologically mature exploration of human consciousness and its role in the patterning of signification, feeling, motivation, expression and action.
To this end, this article sets out to examine and critically evaluate Bourdieu's critique of phenomenology as presented in his Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977) and The Logic of Practice (1990) . While we will on occasion utilize other pieces by Bourdieu where it is found to be helpful to this analysis, we have chosen to focus explicitly upon these two texts since they not only contain his most extended critical readings of phenomenology, but are also the works to which anthropologists most often turn when citing Bourdieu in their own writings.
Since it will not be possible to understand properly Bourdieu's critique without situating it within the context of his broader theoretical orientation, we will first explore some of the key concepts which serve to underpin his version of practice theory. Of particular import for this article are his notions of habitus, body hexis and doxa. Having reviewed these central constructs, we will turn to discuss his critique of phenomenology. Following this, we will examine some of the problems we see with his critique by drawing specifically from the works of Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz. We will conclude with two points: first, a discussion of how Bourdieu's project, while at times richly nuanced, can itself be critiqued for being an overly deterministic rendering of human thought, feeling and behavior; second, we offer a call for anthropologists to rethink the potential benefits that phenomenology can offer to anthropological research.
HABITUS
Habitus is arguably the lynchpin concept of Bourdieu's entire corpus, the one, at the very least, for which he is best known. 1 In Bourdieu's writings there are countless definitions and formulations of the term. Most simply put, however, habitus is an internalized structure or set of structures (derived from pre-existing external structures) that determines how an individual acts in and reacts to the world, serving, as Thompson (1991: 12) phrases it, to 'generate practices, perceptions and attitudes which are regular without ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 2(2) being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any "rule" '. In Outline of a Theory of Practice, Bourdieu defines habitus as a generative system of 'durable, transposable dispositions' that emerges out of a relation to wider objective structures of the social world (1977: 72, original emphasis) . As an internalized collection of durable dispositions and structured proclivities to think, feel, and act, habitus is characterized as a 'conductorless orchestration' that serves to give systematicity, coherence, and consistency to an individual's practices (Bourdieu, 1990: 59) .
The relationship between habitus and structure is thereby one of mutually informing processes of incorporation and objectification. In Bourdieu's estimation, habitus as a system of internalized cognitive and motivating structures is produced by the structures of a particular social environment which are themselves re-produced through the generativity of habitus (Bourdieu, 1977: 72, 78; 1990: 53) . This structured mode of perceiving and appreciating the lived world thus leads to specific behaviors that serve to reproduce the structural frames that first informed habitus. Note that Bourdieu understands these broader structural frames (structure) to be nothing other than 'the material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition ' (1977: 72) . 2 Habitus is thus a socially constructed system of cognitive and motivating structures that are derived directly from materially determined and socially patterned structures (1977: 76) . 3 Bourdieu further characterizes habitus as history transformed into nature (1977: 78) . He believes that what we often mistake to be natural, innate or endogenous processes are 'never anything more than the forgetting of history which history itself produces by incorporating the objective structures it produces in the second nature of habitus ' (1977: 78-9) . Habitus as 'second nature' or forgotten history is 'a spontaneity without consciousness or will ' (1990: 56) . In using the term 'spontaneity' Bourdieu is referring to a non-conscious, pre-reflective activity, which is not predictable. In this regard it is important to note that Bourdieu makes a clear distinction between predictability and determination. In Bourdieu's estimation, just because we can never come to view practice as perfectly predictable does not mean that an individual's habitus is not thoroughly determined (1977: 15, 73, 116) . 4 Recall that Bourdieu believes that habitus is transmitted without conscious intention. He stresses that habitus is grounded exclusively in the 'intentionless invention of regulated improvisation' which entails that an agent's 'actions and works are the product of a modus operandi of which he is not the producer and has no conscious mastery ' (1977: 79) . For precisely this reason Bourdieu criticizes researchers who attempt to work back from practice (opus operatum) to motive (modus operandi). Again, he feels that this underlies the perpetuation of a pernicious view of the agent as a conscious, intentional and rational actor (1977: 36) . He feels that much of the evidence leading researchers to believe that agents are acting in accord with 'consciously felt goals' should be understood as nothing other than attempts on the part of agents to retrospectively rationalize their behavior only after it has spontaneously occurred.
While Bourdieu concedes that it is impossible for every member of the same group or class to have had the exact same experiences in an identical ordering, he feels that the homogeneity of habitus can still be ensured since each member of the same class is more likely than any member of a different class to have been confronted with the situations that are most characteristic for members of that specific class (1977: 85) . 5 In Bourdieu's opinion, variation between individuals is thus due to their membership in certain classes and their specific structural position within such classes. Here then, 'each individual system of dispositions may be seen as a structural variant of all the other group or class habitus, expressing difference between trajectories and positions inside and outside of class ' (1977: 86, emphasis added) . Individual differences in habitus are therefore seen as an expression of the unique position an individual occupies in a particular class-defined social trajectory (1990: 60) .
Finally, habitus also clearly informs Bourdieu's philosophy of mind. He argues, pace Kant (and Lévi-Strauss) , that the world of objects is not the product of the 'sovereign' functioning of consciousness. He is thus against any philosophy of mind which is built upon the idealistic affirmation of universal logical categories of thought (1977: 202) . Instead, he suggests that the very mental structures which come to construct the world of objects are themselves nothing other than constructs derived directly from an individual's practice in a world of objects born from those self-same structures (1977: 91) .
BODY HEXIS
The term body hexis 6 is used by Bourdieu to denote the various socially inculcated ways an individual moves, carries, and positions his or her body in the lived world. Children 'learn' how to perform body movements, gestures, and postures according to prescribed dispositions appropriate for the particular classes of which they are members, by patterning their behavior after the necessary techniques used by others in that class to navigate through culturally constructed and informed spatial configurations (e.g. a house). Body hexis is, in a way, the performative aspect of habitus as 'a durable organization of one's body' (Thompson, 1991: 13) that is 'charged with a host of social meanings and values' (Bourdieu, 1977 (Bourdieu, : 87, 1990 . In Bourdieu's view, body hexis is tied directly to the body's 'motor function' 'in the form of a pattern of postures that is both individual and systematic, being bound up with a whole system of objects ' (1977: 87) .
Body hexis can also be formulated as habit patterns that are specific to the body. As Krais (1993: 161) explains, these habitual body postures, movements, and expressive orientations serve to guide sensual perceptions of one's own body and the bodies of others. Body hexis as the collection of ways in which our bodies are conditioned to habitually stand, speak, walk, and move is therefore a central means by which our identities become somatically informed and grounded. Body hexis is in other words a form of body memory, which is crystallized through practical interaction with the structure of the environmental surround. The 'practical mimesis' underlying body hexis is based on the idea that 'schemes are able to pass directly from practice to practice without moving through discourse and consciousness' (Krais, 1993: 74) . These forms of 'bodily automatisms' are, in Bourdieu's opinion, the root source of our intuitions, feelings and 'common sense'. It is with the careful analysis of these 'motoric schemes' and postures that Bourdieu believes we can come to view the body more accurately as a 'socially informed body' that is structured according to socially inscribed patterns of sense and taste (Bourdieu, 1977: 124) .
DOXA
Doxa is the term Bourdieu uses to describe the beliefs of an individual as 'a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organization [with which] the natural and social world appears as self evident ' (1977: 156) . It is the experience of a 'sense of reality' that is created by habitus and infused with an element of misrecognition of the arbitrariness of relations in and between objective structures. This is, in other words, the process through which socially and culturally constituted ways of perceiving, evaluating and behaving become accepted as unquestioned, selfevident and taken for granted -i.e. 'natural' (1977: 164) . According to Bourdieu, the field of doxa is predicated upon the extent of 'fit' between 'objective structures' and the internalization of those self-same structures in habitus (1977: 166) . It is the successful 'internal' replication of structure that leads individuals to mistake 'objective structures' as 'natural', as they remain ignorant of the ever-present dialectical reconstitution of internal and objective structures.
Doxa as a 'misrecognition' established through tacit consensus is a process in which 'analogical reproduction' and 'mimetic representation' leads to the formation and perpetuation of the 'taken-for-grantedness' of the 'objective' world. Doxa flows from a practical sense that is established in the relation between habitus and structure to which it is attuned (Bourdieu, 1990: 68) . Bourdieu explains that doxa is only foregrounded and made explicit through the interrelation of divergent, novel or competing discourses and practices. He feels that this is most often found in the context of culture contact or with political and economic crises (1977: 168) . For Bourdieu, crisis is then necessary but never sufficient for the questioning of doxa to arise within any one specific community (1977: 169) . 7 Here, Bourdieu introduces the notion that members of different classes will 'naturally' have different interests with regard to the perpetuation of the current structures underlying a group's doxic condition. Where the dominated classes have a vested interest in 'pushing back the limits of doxa and exposing the arbitrariness of the taken for granted; the dominant classes have an interest in defending the integrity of doxa ' (1977: 169) .
BOURDIEU'S STANCE AGAINST PHENOMENOLOGY
The guiding principle of Bourdieu's project is a comprehensive critical analysis of both subjectivist and objectivist traditions in philosophy and the social sciences. His theory purports to fill in the gaps between these two ways of thinking and correct the mistakes inherent in them. Habitus allows Bourdieu 'to break away from the structuralist paradigm without falling back into the old philosophy of the subject or of consciousness' (Bourdieu, 1985: 13) . For him, neither subjectivism (which is primarily proponed by the phenomenologists) nor objectivism (best exemplified by Lévi-Strauss's structuralist anthropology) provides a sufficient explanation for social action. Subjectivism, according to Bourdieu, concentrates too heavily on the immediate experience of the individual and his own interpretations of the social world. Objectivism, on the other hand, refuses to take account of individual actors' actions, and instead relegates them to the social framework within which they function as virtual automatons, shackled to objective relations of social structure. In merging these two traditions Bourdieu purportedly allows habitus to explain individual experience while still retaining a view of the world as a set of relatively obdurate objective structures.
Bourdieu's critique of phenomenology is couched within his broader critique of 'subjectivism' more generally. Under the much too general term 'phenomenology', Bourdieu includes Sartre's existential philosophy, Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, Schutz's social phenomenology and Husserl's genetic phenomenology. As Wacquant (1992: 9) observes, Bourdieu feels that phenomenology is mistaken in its view of society as an emergent product 'of decisions, actions, and cognitions of conscious, alert individuals to whom the world is given as immediately familiar and meaningful'. Bourdieu criticizes Sartre specifically for failing to recognize that subjectivity is constrained by durable dispositions (1990: 42) . Also, he feels that by focusing attention on the description of lived experience in an attempt to make explicit the 'primary experience of the social world', phenomenology is limited to apprehending 'the world as self-evident', 'taken-forgranted ' (1977: 3) . In other words, he feels that phenomenology is flawed because it does not explore how lived experience is produced through the dialectic of internalization of previously externalized structures, and as such remains decidedly deficient in its ability to penetrate the obscuring veils of doxa. Bourdieu therefore charges phenomenology with forgetting to investigate the 'particular conditions which make doxic experience of the social world possible ' (1990: 26) . Because Bourdieu feels that a 'rigorous science of practices' specifically explores the generative source of the internal structures of habitus that underlie the perpetuation of doxa, he argues that his theory of practice and practical knowledge 'has nothing to do with phenomenological reconstitution of lived experience ' (1977: 4) .
Bourdieu feels that phenomenology (especially Garfinkel's ethnomethodology) promotes an 'occasionalist illusion' which fails to acknowledge that interpersonal relations are never restricted to individual-to-individual interactions as there are always wider structural constraints unconsciously informing any particular interaction (Bourdieu, 1977: 81) . He also feels that the phenomenological reduction or epoche (a Husserlian construct), as a deliberate suspension of a naive adherence to the world, is an overly 'intellectualist' operation which does not provide a radical enough break from the misrecognition of the taken-for-granted nature of our lived experience to properly expose the tacitly constituted field of doxa (1977: 168) . Moreover, he argues that phenomenology can further be faulted for never carrying out the 'ultimate reduction' which would turn to examine those social conditions underpinning the 'reduction' itself. That is, he feels that phenomenology does not properly investigate the tacit assumptions underlying the idea that individuals are able to consciously choose to carry out a 'reduction ' (1977: 233) .
Bourdieu feels that phenomenology further gives an exaggerated emphasis to agency in its attempt to describe the ways in which individuals infuse their life-world with meaning and sense (Wacquant, 1992: 9) . In more recent works, he also argues that phenomenology is grounded in a debilitating 'mentalism' which, in terms of its tendency to focus upon mental operations such as 'intentionality', grounds itself primarily in investigating the relationship between noesis (acts of consciousness) and noemata (contents of consciousness), without adequately accounting for the functioning of non-intentional somatic dispositions (Bourdieu, 2000: 132) . Finally, he accuses phenomenologists of ignoring what he believes to be the fact that there can never be 'non-economic ' or 'disinterested' practices (1977: 183) . From his perspective then, even the phenomenological endeavor itself must be understood within the context of a field constituted by symbolic capital and economic interest.
ON FORGETTING HUSSERL'S GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGY
Influenced by Descartes' (1986 Descartes' ( [1641 ) meditations on first principles, Brentano's (1995 Brentano's ( [1874 ) writings on intentionality, Dilthey's (1989 Dilthey's ( [1883 ) 'descriptive psychology', and James ' (1950 [1890] ) insights into the temporal organization of the 'stream of consciousness', Edmund Husserl set out in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to establish what he envisioned to be a new foundation for philosophy. He based this new approach, which he termed 'phenomenology', on the rigorous and detailed exploration of the contents and structures of consciousness. As the name implies, phenomenology was understood to be a science predicated upon the systematic study of phenomena. It is important to understand that Husserl's version of phenomenology, which would later be reworked, extended, and contested in the writings of Heidegger, Schutz, Gurwitsch, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Garfinkel, and others, was first and foremost a methodology. This methodology set out to attenuate those epistemological lacunae grounded in what Husserl perceived to be western philosophy's problematic reliance upon a number of unquestioned, taken-for-granted assumptions about the world. By returning to 'the things themselves', those phenomena given to consciousness in immediate duration, Husserl attempted to ground philosophical speculation in the careful and systematic examination of the contents and structures of lived experience. As Edward Casey puts it, in this way Husserl's phenomenology places 'special stress on firsthand or direct description, thereby minimizing recourse to the highly mediated constructions of metaphysics, natural science, and other theorysaturated disciplines ' (1976: 8-9) . Indeed, Husserl believed that it was only in attempting to first 'bracket' all previously held assumptions about the world -both quotidian and explicitly scientific assumptions which together constitute what he called the 'natural attitude' -that it would be possible to better approximate an accurate description and understanding of any given phenomenon. Ultimately, Husserl believed that it was only through a method of fine-grained phenomenological description that one could begin to elucidate the essential properties of phenomena and the elementary structures of consciousness that contribute to their constitution. It is important to note, however, that Husserl was not privileging description at the expense of genetic 8 explanation since, for him, phenomenological description primarily served as the means through which to generate a genetic account of those phenomena adumbrated in the context of the phenomenological reduction.
The problems inherent in Bourdieu's critique of phenomenology are primarily centered on the fact that he mischaracterizes the phenomenological endeavor, while also not properly acknowledging the ways in which his project overlaps with, and often draws directly from, phenomenological perspectives. In his major works Bourdieu unfairly criticizes phenomenology for its supposed shortcomings, while at the same time ignoring or misrecognizing those aspects of phenomenology that directly prefigure his own theory of social action. Specifically, he misrepresents phenomenological approaches when he criticizes them for naively restricting their inquiry to a description of the life-world and not searching for the generative structures underlying it (Bourdieu, 1990) .
As noted earlier, Husserl's phenomenology is particularly resistant to this form of critique, for his project is focused upon explicitly using the phenomenological reduction (epoche) to penetrate the unquestioned acceptance of the 'natural attitude' in order to reveal the fundamental structures of consciousness that underlie it. 9 In other words, Husserl attempts to use the phenomenological reduction in the service of determining the generative structures of consciousness that underpin an individual's taken-forgranted world of lived experience. Like Bourdieu's concept of doxa, Husserl's notion of the 'natural attitude' is likewise understood as 'the sum of implicit natural convictions about ourselves and the world' (Philipse, 1995: 249) . As Smith and Woodruff Smith explain, for Husserl the reduction or epoche is precisely a method of 'bracketing' our normally unquestioned belief in the natural world around us. That is we put out of action the general thesis of the everyday 'natural' standpoint, our background presupposition that there exists a world independent of our experience . . . By carrying out the reduction we abandon the 'natural' or 'naturalistic' attitude which takes the world for granted and come to adopt instead the phenomenological [attitude] . (Smith and Woodruff Smith, 1995: 11) Granted, in contrast to Bourdieu, who argues that structures of consciousness must themselves be understood as the product of a dialectical 'internalization' of objective structures, Husserl understands these structures as distilled residua of the epoche that are not explicitly tied to 'external reality'. However, unlike Schutz who, in some of his later writings, proposes a 'phenomenology of the life-world' as it is given prior to the reduction, Husserl does not, as Bourdieu repeatedly claims in his critique of phenomenology, stop his analysis with the doxic field as given. 10 Bourdieu's characterization of Husserl's project as primarily 'descriptive' should therefore be read as a gross misrepresentation of Husserl's work. Especially evident in the context of his later writings is Husserl's attempt to outline the basis for a genetic phenomenology that accounts for how it is that the doxic life-world is established and maintained through consciousness and its polythetic acts of constitution that are patterned according to the sedimentation of past experience. Pace Bourdieu, it is important to realize that Husserl was dealing explicitly and directly with a detailed examination of the foundations of our taken-forgranted assumptions about the life-world, and that his entire project consisted precisely in a detailing of 'the particular conditions of possibility of this doxic experience' (Bourdieu, 1990: 26) . The divergence between the views of these two thinkers ultimately rests, however, with Bourdieu's emphasis on the internalization of structure, which Husserl would hold to be an impossibility without the support of those pre-given structures of consciousness (e.g. intentionality and its temporal organization according to processes of protention and retention) that are revealed through the eidetic reduction (Husserl, 1993 (Husserl, [1929 ).
The relationship between Husserl's concept of 'natural attitude' and Bourdieu's concept of doxa seems clear enough. However, there are a few more areas where Bourdieu's work seems to rely heavily on insights that can be traced back to Husserl's phenomenology. For instance, Bourdieu's call for a rigorous science derived from a theory of practice clearly parallels Husserl's view that the discipline of phenomenology which 'deals not with objects but with the acts of consciousness in which objects are given or experienced . . . [is] the only means [by which] philosophy [can] become a "rigorous science" ' (Husserl, 1965; Smith and Woodruff Smith, 1995: 3) . Moreover, there seems to be little originality in Bourdieu's claim that 'scientific construction cannot grasp the principles of practical logic without changing the nature of those principles ' (1977: 117) . Husserl takes up a very similar position in his critique of naive introspection. Much like Bourdieu's view of the pernicious distortion of practice through scientific investigation, Husserl's critique of introspection is focused on the claim that the attention and interest inherent in the introspective stance serves to necessarily alter the spontaneous activity of mental and somatic processes under observation.
Bourdieu's discussion of the limits of objectivist knowledge also resonates with Husserl's critique of naive empiricism which he admonishes for failing to recognize that 'objective' scientific constructs can be traced directly back to their origin in the felt immediacy of lived experience. In his book The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1970 [1954] ), Husserl argues that 'entities' and 'constructs' derived from mathematics, logical thinking and scientific reasoning are often little more than idealized abstractions of the pre-reflective perceptual experience characteristic of the life-world (Mohanty, 1995: 73) . Bourdieu similarly discredits objectivist approaches for not establishing the generative principles underlying the production and reproduction of objective knowledge (1977: 3). However, instead of following Husserl's attempt to trace these generative principles to the immediate lived experience of the life-world, Bourdieu grounds the reified abstractions of the objectivist project in the unconscious internalization of external structures that constitutes habitus. In the end, it seems that Bourdieu's habitus and his attempt to 'objectively' outline the limits of objectivism is often little more than a materialistic rendering of Husserl's life-world and his phenomenological critique of naive empiricism.
Furthermore, it seems that Bourdieu has downplayed Husserl's own usage of the concept of habitus in his later writings. 11 In his posthumously published work entitled Experience and Judgment (1973 [1948] ), Husserl explains that lived experience is erected upon an accumulation of sense experience that results in forgotten 'traces' or 'substrates' that may later direct our attention to similar objects in a horizon of 'typical familiarity and precognizance'. As Husserl puts it: lived experience itself, and the objective moment constituted in it, may become 'forgotten'; but for all this, it in no way disappears without a trace; it has merely become latent. With regard to what has been constituted in it, it is a possession in the form of a habitus, ready at any time to be awakened anew by an active association . . . The object has [therefore] incorporated into itself the forms of sense originally constituted in the acts of explication by virtue of a knowledge in the form of a habitus. (Husserl, 1973 (Husserl, [1948 : 122, emphasis in the original) Even though Bourdieu's structurally infused understanding may, for some, seem to move beyond Husserl's view that habitus is nothing other than previously acquired, latent anticipations and cognitions (knowledge), there does seem to be a great deal of unacknowledged overlap between these two versions of what has been long seen to be one of Bourdieu's most original theoretical contributions. Moreover, we believe that in the end Husserl's version of habitus surpasses Bourdieu's formulation, for it explicitly allows for the ever-present possibility that an individual can strive 'to establish this habitus voluntarily' (Husserl, 1973 (Husserl, [1948 : 123). This is not to say that Bourdieu himself does not explicitly refer to agents' ability to manipulate their own habitus (see Bourdieu, 2000: 33-48, 120-1) . He indeed does, and rather enigmatically as well. The problem, however, seems to reside in the lack of internal consistency of Bourdieu's overall theoretical framework, which explicitly holds that habitus is a non-intentional and non-conscious product of internalized structure.
SCHUTZ'S SOCIAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Further evidence for Bourdieu's misrepresentation of phenomenology can be found in his critical dialogue with the work of Alfred Schutz. Schutz's project was aimed at taking the phenomenological perspective and applying it to the social world. Such a move from what Bourdieu would term an 'intellectualist' approach to the world of everyday experience, however, does not mean that Schutz necessarily extended his ideas beyond a philosophical scope. Indeed, in his correspondence with Talcott Parsons Schutz repeatedly stressed the necessity of a sound philosophical basis for any social scientific endeavor, a disagreement which would last the duration of their acquaintance (see Grathoff, 1978) . Nevertheless, Schutz did produce a phenomenological sociology that continues to thrive, most notably in the fields of ethnomethodology (e.g. Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984) , conversation analysis (e.g. Sacks et al., 1974) , and the sociology of knowledge (e.g. Berger and Luckmann, 1966) .
For Schutz, modes of thought are divided into two types, common sense and scientific, the first being that with which individuals qua subjective actors experience the lived world, and the second being that with which social scientists examine those actors in the world. All knowledge, according to Schutz, 'involves constructs, i.e. a set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations, idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization' (Schutz, 1962: 5) . Such being the case, all knowledge involves a medium of interpretation between it and the world. For Schutz, the difference between common sense knowledge and social scientific knowledge is that the latter is gained according to 'constructs of the second degree, namely constructs of the constructs made by actors on the social scene ' (1962: 6) . The objects of study for social scientists, unlike their counterparts in the natural sciences, exist in a world in which they think, perceive, rationalize, interpret, judge and act and therefore create the problem of orders of construction.
For Bourdieu this is one of the problematic aspects of phenomenology. He claims that 'one is entitled to undertake to give an "account of accounts" so long as one does not put forward one's contribution to the science of pre-scientific representation of the social world as if it were a science of the social world' (Bourdieu, 1977: 21) . He explains further that the 'prerequisite for a science of common sense representations which seeks to be more than a complicitous description is a science of the structures which govern both practices and the concomitant representations, the latter being the principal obstacle to the constitution of such a science ' (1977: 21) . As discussed earlier, Bourdieu here as elsewhere (Bourdieu, 1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) falsely characterizes phenomenology as a merely descriptive endeavor. We feel, however, that Schutz's phenomenology is no more descriptive than scientific treatises gleaned from empirical investigations of action. Like scientific work, Schutz's phenomenology seeks to explain the nature of what we observe both as actors in the world and as researchers with finelyhoned professional vision (see Goodwin, 1994) . But Schutz's work is not in and of itself scientific. As stated earlier, Schutz believes that any social science must rest on a strong philosophical foundation, since all science does so nevertheless, whether one chooses to acknowledge that or not. His entire project is to give the science of interpretive sociology, as proposed by Weber, a rigorous philosophical analysis. His phenomenology does not treat 'the science of pre-scientific representation of the social world' as a science of the social world, as Bourdieu claims, but instead divides the world which social scientists study into appropriate units of analysis. His treatment of the 'pre-scientific representation of the social world' is a means through which social scientists can access their objects of study, namely their own relationships to what both Schutz and Bourdieu would call objective structures.
Schutz is primarily concerned with the notion that scientists can never have access to the meanings of the representations which Bourdieu claims are produced by habitus and that are 'concomitant with practice', without a systematic phenomenological investigation of the structures of experience. To posit that a given representation is meaningful without examining how individuals construe meaning from it and attribute meaning to it is an exercise in futility. Thus Schutz makes efforts to distinguish common-sense knowledge from scientific knowledge, to separate scientists from their objects of study, and to explore how both scientists and social actors come to attribute 'subjective meaning' to any action.
An important component to Bourdieu's critique of Schutz's social phenomenology rests in his claim that Schutz relies too heavily upon premeditated, intentional action which follows an intellectualist fallacy that he characterizes elsewhere as 'crediting agents with the reasoning reason of the scientist reasoning about their action' (Bourdieu, 2000: 60) . Bourdieu holds in contrast that it is seldom the case that action stems from conscious, intentional, or reflective reference to motivations or 'projects' since most action is more accurately generated by a 'practical feel', or a habituated automaticity that is the antithesis of conscious reflection. Here we are again confronted with a misreading and mischaracterization of Schutz's position, which not only leaves room for pre-reflective action directed by a practical sense, but further demonstrates that it is often the case that conscious motives and projects do play important roles in patterning social action. As Schutz points out, it is important to recall that 'the meaning of an action is different depending on the point in time from which it is observed ' (1967 [1932] : 65). In accord with Bourdieu, Schutz explains that behavior, as it occurs in pure duration, is in fact 'pre-phenomenal'. In the immediacy of the 'deed in the doing' there is no reflection upon the act in progress or the goals to which it may be directed. In this pre-phenomenal stage behavior is directed by 'halos of retention and protention' which surround every lived experience, and which serve to at least partially direct action according to the dictates of the individual's past experiences (1967 [1932] : 19). That being said, Schutz is also careful, however, to distinguish between pre-phenomenal behavior and phenomenal action, which is behavior carried out in service of a projected act. In this respect, the conscious project 'anticipates not the action itself but the [completed] act ' (1967 [1932] : 67). As Schutz makes clear, depending on whether or not a theorist is focusing upon the pure project stage, the action in progress, or the act as it has been already executed, there will be very different ways to interpret the agent's conscious attention to their motivations, intentions, plans and goals (1967 [1932] : 64). For Schutz, then, it is never simply the case that either a practical, pre-phenomenal sense or a reflective, phenomenal project serve to direct an individual's action, since at different stages of action there will be differing contributions from pre-reflective and reflective experience. Moreover, it is clear that practical experience itself must be understood to interpenetrate with representational and intentional processes such that any attempt to argue for the priority of either sphere must certainly do a disservice to the actual lived experience of agents in their day-to-day interactions within their social and physical environments.
Further mischaracterizations of Schutz's work can be found in Bourdieu's belief that a Schutzian social phenomenology does not adequately take into account the 'structures that govern both practices and concomitant representations' (Bourdieu, 1977: 21) . What Bourdieu describes as habitus closely resembles Schutz's description of subjective experience structured within a social phenomenological framework. According to Schutz, at birth an individual enters into an already constituted social world that has been previously created by other individuals and communities. Individuals all carry with them unique biographies, or knowledge gained prior to some particular interpretive event, part of which was gained through personal experience, and 'the greater part [of which] is socially derived, handed down to me by my friends, my parents, my teachers and the teachers of my teachers' (Schutz, 1962: 13) . These biographies influence the ways in which individuals will interpret the world they experience by providing appropriate ' "knowledge at hand" [to] function as a scheme of reference' (1962: 7) in understanding particular aspects of the perceived environment both as objects qua objects and objects as belonging to and constitutive of that environment.
In his work Schutz explicitly refers to the structure of the life-world, which is a major part of the thrust of his phenomenology (see especially chapter 4 of Schutz, 1967 Schutz, [1932 ). He does not, however, point to an almost palpable 'entity' like habitus (structured structure predisposed to function as a structuring structure), which is a thing that does something (namely influences people's experience of the world), but instead treats his subject matter more as a process. This is the gap between Schutz and Bourdieu which the latter treats as relatively unbridgeable. Ultimately, however, they are addressing the issue of experience in a somewhat similar fashion since both feel that it is bounded by 'structural contexts that are involved in the constitution of an external object ' (1967 [1932] : 78). Schutz, indeed, characterizes the social world as not essentially structureless. It has a particular meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, thinking, and acting therein. They have preselected and preinterpreted this world by a series of common-sense constructs of the reality of daily life, and it is these thought objects that determine their behavior, define the goals of their action, the means available for attaining them -in brief, that help them to find their bearings within their natural and socio-cultural environment and to come to terms with it (Schutz, 1962: 6) .
The thought objects and common-sense constructs referred to by Schutz are as close to habitus as Schutz gets, lacking only the level of structure Bourdieu finds appropriate for habitus. The social world is clearly structured and we act within it according to previous, socially determined and inculcated experience, claims Schutz. This only differs from habitus in that Schutz seldom explicitly refers to internalized structures.
According to Schutz the majority of what we see in our daily lives, within a 'horizon of familiarity', is taken for granted. There is no second-order reflection by mundane subjects on the meaning inherent in social action. As Natanson phrases it (1962: xxvii), the 'structures of daily life are not themselves recognized or appropriated formally by common sense'. In this sense Schutz's phenomenology does account for the same misrecognition that is part of Bourdieu's doxic experience. In fact Schutz's entire project is predicated on this idea that the structures of the life-world are often unrecognizable to those individuals acting and reacting within it. Moreover, according to Schutz, this taken-for-grantedness stems from the historical and socially distributed conditions of knowledge that influence our experience with the world, that contribute to our own knowledge at hand upon which we draw to interpret social facts. The social scientist as analyst, with his or her access to scientific knowledge and methodologies, is able to transcend common-sense knowledge (within the confines of his or her investigative endeavor) to interpret social facts and human actions in relation to objective structures that are normally unavailable to actors. This is the same position that Bourdieu himself implicitly takes. As an analyst he is able to see and identify habitus, hexis, and doxa according to his own position in relation to objective structure. To be sure, he is always influenced by his own habitus, as Schutz and all social scientists are influenced by their own biographies and internalized thought objects. By the very fact that Bourdieu is himself the author of his practice theory, with all the power necessarily inherent in the creation process (for all creations involve power divisions between creator and created, or, in the case of theory, theorizer and theorized), while not explicitly providing an 'account of accounts', he is maintaining the same division between common sense and scientific knowledge, between first and second order interpretations, between the 'accounts of accounts' for which his is most predominantly against phenomenology.
In his latest book Bourdieu (2000) attempts to 'reread' Schutzian phenomenology in light of his own concept of habitus. Once he has done so, he admits, phenomenology has the virtue of recalling what is most particularly ignored or repressed, especially in universes in which people tend to think of themselves as free of conformisms and beliefs, namely the relation of often insurmountable submission which binds all social agents, whether they like it or not, to the social world of which they are, for better or worse, the products. (2000: 173) Bourdieu ignores the fact that, except for the notion of habitus as a thing, all of the points he claims to find in his rereading were already present in phenomenological texts. Here, as elsewhere, Bourdieu seems to be merely rephrasing some of Schutz's premises in his own idiosyncratic and overly deterministic vocabulary so as to make them sound new, when in reality they are not. As was demonstrated earlier, Schutz was not as divergent from Bourdieu as Bourdieu himself insists and the persistent distinction is somewhat puzzling, especially since Bourdieu now seems to grant phenomenology more leeway than in the past. This latest formulation seems to claim that phenomenological analysis is at least sufficient if one takes into account habitus, which is ultimately an unfair criticism since Schutz in fact did take into account processes quite similar to habitus.
Our point here is not to say that Bourdieu, Husserl and Schutz should be understood as outlining identical projects. Clearly this is not the case. The goal of this all too brief comparison is to point to the fact that Bourdieu's critique of phenomenology does not properly acknowledge the significant inspiration he drew from this tradition. With his lack of specificity in criticizing a grossly generalized 'phenomenology', Bourdieu obscures the many ways in which his thought connects to the thought of phenomenologists, and in so doing, we feel, does a great disservice to his readers by directing them to disregard the many important insights that have been derived from the phenomenological tradition.
DISCUSSION
Having outlined the shortcomings of Bourdieu's critical rendering of phenomenology, we will now turn to discuss what we perceive to be one of the most disturbing problems with Bourdieu's theoretical vision, namely that it provides us with an overly deterministic rendering of human experience and behavior. While Bourdieu's practice theory takes a step away from the objectivist model of social structure, it only nominally deals with subjective experience, which is, according to his view, always mediated by inculcated structures that already reflect the objective structures being perceived. This tautological take on subjective experience still ultimately leaves agents at the whim of structure, and it is this treatment of the social actor that is the most puzzling aspect of Bourdieu's synthetic grand theory. It has also been the main impetus for this analysis of his critique of phenomenology.
We are not alone in this reading of Bourdieu. While Bourdieu's version of practice theory and his concept of habitus have certainly served to highlight many of the problems inherent in relying exclusively on an overly intellectualized understanding of enculturative processes, there are indeed a number of scholars who also criticize Bourdieu's theory for doing away with the agency of the conscious human subject (see Alexander, 1995: 130-6; Calhoun, 1993: 72; Comaroff, 1985: 5; DiMaggio, 1979 DiMaggio, : 1467 Frow, 1995: 27-47; Garnham and Williams, 1980: 222; Jenkins, 1982 Jenkins, , 1992 Ortner, 1996: 11; Strauss and Quinn, 1997) .
In accord with these scholars, we view Bourdieu's critique of subjectivism, and of phenomenology, to be fundamentally flawed. In fact, while we believe that Bourdieu can be commended for his 'anti-intellectualism' and his distancing from a strictly representational understanding of human behavior and experience, we feel that it is his very phenomenological naivety that has led him to mistakenly characterize all nonrepresentational states as necessarily 'non-conscious' and as such beyond the control of the conscious and willing agent. In fact, we believe that Bourdieu's overly deterministic rendering of human experience and behavior is a direct result of his lack of attention to his own phenomenology.
Phenomenologists have long recognized the fact that consciousness should not be reduced merely to representational content, for it is also infused with conative (willful, volitional), sensory and affective capacities that can act with relative degrees of autonomy within the complex coherence of conscious experience. Indeed, phenomenologists have demonstrated that attention and interest function such that facts of consciousness may be relegated to the peripheries of our awareness while still remaining properly part and parcel of consciousness, and as such potentially available for conscious manipulation. From this perspective then, the flux of consciousness is always infused with contents that are never exclusively conceptual, discursive, or representational. To conflate representational, discursive or reflective thought with consciousness, intentionality and/or agency is thus, in our view, a problematic stance that holds that all non-discursive contents of consciousness (including feeling states, emotions, and other bodily processes) are completely beyond our conscious control. True, there is a degree of automaticity in all of our actions, however, the belief that there is also always a strict delineation between habitual responses and our conscious life, or that our intentions, motives and goals do not figure into directing our habituated responses is, we believe, an untenable theoretical position. 12 Indeed, habitual practices are often infused with verbally mediated and fully conscious representations, images and concepts. Likewise, while it may often be the case that a number of our personally, socially and culturally patterned responses to perceptual, sensory and conceptual stimuli are habitual, it is also the case that these habitual responses can often be immediately available to conscious reflection in their real-time occurrence. In other words, just because a particular response, behavior, thought pattern, evoked emotion, feeling or sensation is habitual or automatic, this does not in itself perforce entail that individuals are not to some degree aware of these habitual responses as they occur. This conflation of automaticity, habituation and nonconscious processes provides, therefore, for a fundamentally flawed model of human mentation and action that is far removed from how these processes are directly apprehended by individuals in the context of their lived experience. Here then, it seems that it may be time for practice theory to return, with phenomenology, to the actual lived experience of agents (including investigators themselves), whose lives are indeed often importantly affected by 'consciously felt' goals, feelings and ideals.
In this light, we feel that it is also necessary to comment briefly on Bourdieu's distrust of 'native accounts'. Bourdieu argues that the problem with reliance on 'native' accounts lies in the fact that not only do they lead researchers to form 'illusory explanation' but they also 'bring quite superfluous reinforcement to the intellectualist tendency inherent in objectivist approaches ' (1977: 19) . By 'intellectualist tendency' Bourdieu is again referring to what he believes to be a mistaken reliance on the 'rational' decision-making processes of a conscious/intentional agent. While we agree with Bourdieu that anthropologists should avoid a naive acceptance of 'native accounts', we believe that his thorough distrust of the 'native's view' is highly problematic. By privileging the investigator's account which must set out to uncover the underlying unconscious determinants of behavior in the generative organization of habitus, Bourdieu often trivializes or simply discounts the meanings attributed to events, experiences and behaviors that are given by the people themselves. The same critiques raised against structuralist and functionalist paradigms in anthropology can effectively be raised against Bourdieu who, with his emphasis on the non-conscious grounding of social action, leaves little room for giving validity to the world as it is experienced by actors who must negotiate their day-to-day interactions with their social and physical surroundings. For individual actors it is precisely the life-world as experienced that has consequence for these interactions. As Schutz (1967 Schutz ( [1932 ) argued, it is indeed the doxic realm of the life-world that informs and gives meaning to the lived experience of individuals. If this is true, then Bourdieu's theoretical orientation is particularly deficient in its ability to give proper credence to 'native' accounts. Here it is precisely the type of phenomenological analysis which Bourdieu decries that is, we believe, best able to provide investigators with important insights into the most salient and meaningful aspects of the world of the individual as experienced by them.
It is indeed ironic that in this regard phenomenology offers anthropology -a discipline that has at various points in its development sought to ground itself in cultural investigations derived directly from 'native' accounts -an important corrective to many of its most pre-eminent theoretical approaches. Now it is true that from Boas to Sapir to Hallowell to Geertz, there have been many anthropologists interested in exploring the intersection between individual agency, social action and the imposition of meaning upon worlds of experience. With few exceptions, 13 however, these explorations have all too often resulted in theoretical positions grounded upon the somewhat simplistic mapping of cultural resources upon pliable individual minds and bodies. Perhaps most notably, Geertz 14 (1983) , who is often remembered for his concern for the 'native's point of view' and for emphasizing the significance of developing an 'experience-near' 15 anthropology, can be criticized in this regard (see Strauss and Quinn, 1997: 13-23) . Here Geertz's Rylean-inspired rejection of putatively occult 'mental happenings', his metaphorical likening of culture to a text, his turn to the analysis of public symbols, and his view that these symbols provide both 'models of ' and 'models for reality', all contribute to rendering his version of interpretive anthropology amenable to many of the critiques waged against Bourdieu's structural determinism (Geertz, 1973a (Geertz, , 1983 . While Geertz certainly seeks to balance emic and etic approaches in his hermeneutical 'tacking' between 'experience-near' and 'experience-distant' analyses, the result of his endeavor, however, is an all too generic representation of the 'native', whose point of view is so central to his interpretive enterprise. Ultimately this approach does not situate 'experience-near' categories in the lived experience of the individuals who draw from those selfsame categories, thereby serving to occlude the often variegated organization of cultural resources in the life-worlds of particular culture bearers.
In this light, we argue that phenomenology can provide anthropology with an approach that grounds the replication and transmission of cultural forms in an understanding of the inherent complexities of those contents and structures of consciousness that subserve these processes. Again it seems that we are not alone in this view, as the growing number of phenomenologically informed anthropological studies attests (see Csordas, 1994a Csordas, , 1994b Good, 1994; Jackson, 1989 Jackson, , 1996 Laughlin et al., 1990) . 16 Ultimately, in recognizing and in systematically investigating the intricacies of subjective experience and agency, a phenomenologically informed anthropology provides for a significant movement away from what Strauss and Quinn (1997) have characterized as the 'mirror' or 'fax' model of internalization that is so prevalent in much of anthropological theory. Indeed, turning back to Schutz's model, we find that his call for the temporalization of meaning and social action presents new challenges for those anthropological perspectives that have traditionally assumed a simple match between cultural forms and subjective experience. It also renders problematic the perpetuation of polemical positions between deterministic and agentive views of the human condition, for it demonstrates how every act, when situated in the context of its real-time unfolding, is infused to various extents with both predetermined structure and individual intentionality. And as Husserl's genetic phenomenology also makes clear, a phenomenologically grounded approach may also reveal those pre-given structures of consciousness that help to account for mutual intelligibility between what are otherwise the variably articulated attunements of particular life-worlds that are always both individually and culturally constituted.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we stress that it is not our intention to be unfair to Bourdieu. Our goal has been to demonstrate what we feel are the unnecessary criticisms of phenomenology in his work. Couched within that goal is a more modest one. Phenomenology is an undervalued and widely ignored tool in anthropology. This may be so perhaps because many anthropologists gain exposure to this tradition only through Bourdieu's interpretation of phenomenology which, as we have seen, focuses primarily upon its many supposed inadequacies. However, when one reads the material, one can see that there are many beneficial aspects of phenomenology for anthropologists, especially those concerned with investigating the cultural patterning of subjective experience.
Along with Schutz, we feel that if we ever hope to develop an adequate account of social action it will be necessary to first ground anthropological research in systematic phenomenological investigations of those structures of consciousness that contribute to the patterning of experience, the attribution of meaning, and the cultural constitution of the life-world. As Bourdieu correctly points out, part of this enterprise would indeed consist, in part, in capturing the pre-reflective stance that is embodied in 'practical sense'. However, outlining the role of 'practical sense' is by no means the entire story. This is precisely where we are confronted with the inadequacies of Bourdieu's project, for while he attempts to transcend the polemical divide between subjectivist and objectivist perspectives with his emphasis on 'practical sense' as inscribed in habitus, in this endeavor he serves to create a new polemic between practical (bodily) and intellectual (mental) operations. Where Bourdieu's project fails, phenomenology can provide us with a more accurate perspective, for it offers researchers a methodology through which to carefully attend to the workings of consciousness in the totality of is operations and structures.
As we have mentioned earlier, a further important advantage to phenomenology seems to be its ability to give both descriptive and genetic accounts of experience. Unlike Bourdieu, who seems to decry the significance of descriptive endeavors, phenomenology takes the doxic life-world as a significant field of exploration in its own right, while also comprehending the necessity for providing a genetic account for the emergence of that same field. Moreover, phenomenologists following the Husserlian tradition have long recognized that any genetic account of that field must not mistake this process for a simple mapping of externalized structures upon a tabula rasa mind. Where Bourdieu does little to acknowledge the fact that consciousness must itself be somewhat structured for there to be the very possibility of the internalization of external structure, Husserl (1993 Husserl ( [1929 ) was clear to spell out how the phenomenological and eidetic reductions can serve to outline the parameters of the pre-given structures of consciousness, which underpin the very possibility for a dialectical process of internalization and externalization to ever occur.
Finally, it is important for anthropologists to realize how the phenomenological enterprise can aid researchers in their struggle to cope with prejudice and bias. As a methodology, phenomenology is predicated on training researchers to systematically investigate the various processes through which the natural attitude is constituted. By first becoming aware of the contours of our natural attitude, and then through a systematic attempt to bracket the structures which underpin that stance, phenomenology hopes to provide researchers with a means by which to better comprehend the many ways through which the mind is predisposed to project bias upon the world. By turning to a more careful reading of phenomenology, and by working to investigate our own subjective experience prior to entering the field, we feel that anthropologists will be better able to recognize when they are merely projecting their own natural attitude whole cloth onto a given field of investigation, or when they are working to asymptotically approach a less biased perspective in their observation and interaction (see also Laughlin et al., 1990: 21-32) . Ultimately, we believe, anthropologists will be losing a large amount of potentially valuable insights with which to approach and navigate the challenges of anthropological research if we continue to rely upon Bourdieu's evaluation and dismissal of phenomenology in an uncritical and all-embracing manner.
provide the 'genetic' foundation for the structuring of any particular phenomena under investigation. While there is some debate over the extent to which Husserl's early 'descriptive' and later 'genetic' phenomenology can be reconciled, as Philipse notes, the idea that 'a pre-theoretical description of phenomena is possible was never really abandoned, not even in Husserl's later "genetic" phenomenology' (Philipse, 1995: 261) . 9 It is important to note that here we are not claiming that Bourdieu never recognizes Husserl's influence upon his own writings for on occasion he does. This seems to occur, however, primarily in an attempt to position himself in opposition to Husserl's project. In this light, our argument in this section is based primarily on our observation that where Bourdieu does refer to Husserl he often mischaracterizes Husserl's ideas and/or fails to properly acknowledge the positive influence that Husserl's thinking has had upon his own theoretical formulations. 10 This is not to say that Schutz was not also interested in detailing the 'constituting phenomena' underpinning the structure of the life world. In fact in his book Herbert Mead, Mitchell Aboulafia notes that in this regard 'it could be argued that Mead has an advantage over Bourdieu . . . for while both tend to bifurcate the reflective and non-reflective, Mead doesn't view reflective activities as somehow opposed to -and less authentic than -non-reflective ones, but as intertwined with them in our daily affairs' (Aboulafia, 1999: 161) . 13 Two of the most notable exceptions in this regard are Edward Sapir (1958a) and Irving Hallowell (1955) , who both placed a high value on understanding the variable articulation of cultural forms and individual experience. As Sapir notes in his essay 'The Emergence of the Concept of Personality in the Study of Culture':
The complete, impersonalized 'culture' of the anthropologist can really be little more than an assembly or mass of loosely overlapping idea and action systems which, through verbal habit, can be made to assume the appearance of a closed system of behavior. What tends to be forgotten is that the functioning of such a system, if it can be said to have any ascertainable function at all, is due to the specific functioning and interplays of the idea and action systems which have actually grown up in the minds of given individuals. In spite of the often assorted impersonality of culture, the humble truth remains that vast reaches of culture, far from being in any real sense 'carried' by a community or a group as such, are discoverable only as the peculiar property of certain individuals, who cannot but give these cultural goods the impress of their own personality. (1958b: 594-5) 14 Early in his career Geertz indeed attempted to incorporate some phenomenological insights into his own work. In 'Person, Time, and Conduct in Bali' (1973b) , originally published in 1966, Geertz used Schutz's classification of the people inhabiting one's social world into consociates, contemporaries, predecessors, and successors as a point of departure for his analysis of Balinese experience, namely personal identity and conceptions of time. This initial foray into phenomenology, which was in fact hardly more than a borrowing of terminology, never found footing in Geertz's overall theoretical framework (cf. Munn, 1992: 98-100) . This is peculiar in light of Geertz's claim that:
[w]hat is needed is some systematic, rather than merely literary or impressionistic, way to discover what is given, what the conceptual structure embodied in the symbolic forms through which persons are perceived actually is. What we want and do not yet have is a developed method of describing and analysing the meaningful structure of experience (here, the experience of persons) as it is apprehended by representative members of a particular society at a particular point in time -in a word, a scientific phenomenology of culture. (Geertz, 1973b: 364) Unfortunately Geertz never seems to have developed this nascent interest in phenomenology much further. Had he done so he may have discovered that the seeds for such a methodology were already sown by the phenomenological tradition upon which he draws. With the notable exception of his expressed desire to seek out 'representative members of society', we feel this formulation of 'what is needed' in fact succinctly encapsulates some of our own endeavors in this article. 15 Geertz borrowed the distinction between 'experience-near' and 'experience-distant' concepts from the psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut. As Geertz explains, '[a]n experiencenear concept is, roughly, one that someone -a patient, a subject, in our case an informant -might himself naturally and effortlessly use to define what he or his fellows see, feel, think, imagine . . . [whereas an] experience-distant concept is one that specialists of one sort or another -an analyst, an experimenter, an ethnographer . . . employ to forward their scientific, philosophical, or practical aims ' (1983: 57; cf. Schutz, 1962 , as well as our discussion for Schutz's distinction between 'commonsense knowledge' and 'scientific knowledge'). For more on 'experience-near' anthropology see Hollan (2001) and Wikan (1991) . 16 It is interesting to note that despite Bourdieu's own critical appraisal of phenomenology, his version of practice theory also informs some of this most recent work in phenomenological anthropology. Indeed, Csordas attempts to situate his 'cultural phenomenology' between Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body and Bourdieu's musings on habitus (Csordas, 1994a: 7-12) . Moreover, Jackson, well aware of Bourdieu's critical assessment of Husserl, Schutz and others, believes that in the end, despite his 'caveats and cavils, Bourdieu's emphasis on mundane strategizing, practical taxonomies, bodily habits, social usages, and agency makes his notion of habitus directly compatible to the notion of lifeworld' (Jackson, 1996: 20) . While we do not wish to suggest that the gulf between Bourdieu's practice theory and phenomenology is strictly unbridgeable -for as already discussed we too see a number of points of correspondence between the two perspectives -we believe that in this particular case the otherwise perspicacious Csordas and Jackson have perhaps exaggerated the similarities between the two positions. While we believe that in many instances Bourdieu is indeed closer to the phenomenological tradition in his thinking than he might otherwise like to admit, it is also the case that some of the differences between the two approaches in terms of their theories of consciousness, intentionality and agency are indeed more real than apparent.
